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“[O]ne bad algorithm and you’re at war.”1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION
 
  
Big data technology and machine learning techniques play a growing role across all 
areas of modern society. Machine learning provides the ability to predict likely future 
outcomes, to calculate risks between competing choices, to make sense of vast amounts of 
data at speed, and to draw insights from data that would be otherwise invisible to human 
analysts.2 As such, the use of machine learning presents a significant opportunity to transform 
how we understand and engage with issues across a range of subject areas, and to use this 
more-developed understanding to enhance decision-making. Although still at a relatively 
early stage, the deployment of machine learning algorithms has already begun. For example, 
doctors use machine learning algorithms to match symptoms to a particular illness, or to 
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identify individuals at risk of developing a particular health condition to target preventive 
intervention.3 In a criminal justice context, courts use machine learning algorithms to 
establish individual risk profiles and to predict the likelihood that a particular individual will 
re-offend.4  The private sector uses similar techniques for tasks as diverse as determining 
credit ratings and targeting advertising.5 
The advantages that flow from machine learning algorithms mean that it is inevitable 
that governments will begin to employ them—in one form or another—to help officials 
decide whether, when, and how to resort to force internationally.  In some cases, these 
algorithms may lead to more accurate and defensible uses of force than we see today; in other 
cases, states may intentionally abuse these algorithms to engage in acts of aggression, or 
unintentionally misuse algorithms in ways that lead them to make inferior decisions relating 
to force.  Indeed, it is likely that machine learning techniques are already informing use of 
force decisions to a greater degree than we appreciate. For many years, intelligence agencies 
have steadily increased their use of machine learning.6 Although these current uses are likely 
to be several steps removed from decision-making at the national leadership level, 
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intelligence analysis heavily influences use of force decisions.7  It is likely that machine 
learning algorithms increasingly will inform this analysis. Despite the significant attention 
given to machine learning generally in academic writing and public discourse, there has been 
little analysis of how it may affect war-making decisions, and even less analysis from an 
international law perspective. 
Of course, one should not simply assume that machine learning will give rise to new 
legal considerations. Indeed, issues relating to new technology may often be resolved by the 
relatively straightforward application of existing law. With respect to the law on the resort to 
force, however, there are three areas in which machine learning either raises new challenges 
or adds significant complexity to existing debates. First, the use of machine learning is likely 
to lead to the automation of at least some types of self-defense responses. Although some 
militaries currently deploy automated response systems, these tend to be fixed, defensive 
systems designed only to react to incoming threats and minimize the harm from those 
threats.8  The use of machine learning raises the possibility of automated self-defense systems 
in a much wider variety of contexts, systems that could draw on the resources of the entire 
armed forces and possess the capacity to launch counter-attacks. This is a new challenge that 
scholars have not yet addressed. 
Second, the increased use of machine learning-produced analysis in the (human) 
decision-making process raises questions about the quality and reliability of the analysis, and 
the level of deference that humans will give to machine learning-produced recommendations 
(i.e., whether a human will be willing to overrule the machine). These issues are not new in 
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and of themselves – questions about the reliability of intelligence sources and the weight to 
give to a particular recommendation have long existed – but, as we show herein, machine 
learning techniques raise new questions and add layers of complexity to existing debates. 
Third, discussions regarding machine learning inevitably give rise to questions about 
the explainability and transparency of the decision-making process. On the one hand, the 
nature of machine learning means that the reasons underpinning a machine’s particular 
recommendation or exercise of automated decision-making may not be transparent or 
explainable. While a lack of public-facing transparency regarding use of force decisions is 
not new, at issue here is the quality and interrogability of the recommendation that the 
machine produces for the decision maker. The state may therefore not only be unwilling to 
explain the reasons behind a particular course of action it takes, it may be unable to do so. On 
the other hand, if a state can program an algorithm to explain its recommendations, this may 
actually increase a state’s ability to explain the rationale underpinning its decision to use 
force. In this context, machine learning again adds complexity to existing debates. 
This essay’s goal is to draw attention to current and near future developments that 
may have profound implications for international law, and to present a blueprint for the 
necessary analysis. More specifically, this essay seeks to identify the most likely ways in 
which states will begin to employ machine learning algorithms to guide their decisions about 
when and how to use force, to identify legal challenges raised by use of force-related 
algorithms, and to recommend prophylactic measures for states as they begin to employ these 
tools.  
Part II sets out specific scenarios in which it seems likely that states will employ 
machine learning tools in the use of force context.  Part III then explores the challenges that 
states are likely to confront when developing and deploying machine learning algorithms in 
this context, and identifies some initial ways in which states could address these challenges. 
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In use of force decisions, the divide between policy and legal doctrine is often disputed. 
Some may consider aspects of this essay to be matters of policy, while others may consider 
those same aspects to be matters of legal obligation. The purpose of the essay is not to resolve 
those debates, but rather to focus on emerging concepts and challenges that states should 
consider whenever artificial intelligence plays an influential role in their decisions to use 
force, in light of the international legal framework. 
  
II. RESORT TO FORCE SCENARIOS 
  
States must make a variety of calculations when confronted with a decision about 
whether to use force against or inside another state.  The UN Charter provides that states may 
lawfully use force in self-defense if an armed attack occurs.9  This means that a state that 
fears that it is likely to be the subject of an armed attack will urgently want to understand how 
likely it is that the threatened attack will manifest in actual violence.  Equally, a state subject 
to an armed attack will seek to understand which actor attacked it, whether it appears 
necessary to use force in response to that attack, and whether its response would be 
proportionate.10  In situations such as these, it appears increasingly likely that states will seek 
to use machine learning technology to strengthen their decision-making processes, both in a 
traditional reactive sense and in a predictive context.  War-gaming exercises provide a 
straightforward example that demonstrates the potential utility of machine learning.11  These 
exercises currently rely on a form of role-playing of adversaries, and could further be 
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enhanced and transformed by machine learning systems that are able to provide modelling 
and simulations based on advanced analysis of capabilities and behaviour patterns, and thus 
provide a more accurate tool for assessing the flow of events. 
Beyond these general use of force inquiries, there are two other contexts in which 
machine learning might come into play.  The first context is in cyber operations: states may 
begin to produce and rely on machine learning-driven algorithms that allow them to defend 
against cyber attacks at the speed of light, in what may come to look like automatic self-
defense.  The second context is somewhat novel, but is likely to represent an emerging threat.  
It is possible that states and nonstate actors may use machine learning to forge messages—
such as video commands ordering an attack or retreat, statements by politicians, or threats of 
war—in order to gain an advantage in the context of both the resort to force and the conduct 
of armed conflict.12 By employing sophisticated video and audio forgeries enhanced by 
recent advances in machine learning, an actor may attempt to manipulate the target state’s 
chain of command or public opinion. This possibility raises a number of new challenges, and 
brings into play several rules of international law, but is distinct from the self-defense 
framework on which this essay focuses, so we do not discuss it further herein. 
  
A. Informing the Exercise of Self-Defense 
 
States may use machine learning to help them decide when to act in self-defense.  
There is a longstanding debate about whether and when it is permissible to use force before 
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an armed attack is actually completed.13  A variety of states and scholars accept that a state 
may act in situations in which the attack has not yet occurred,14 but where the need to respond 
is “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation.”15  Others go further, arguing that in some contexts it may be appropriate for a 
state to act to prevent a particular, tangible, and serious threat from turning into an armed 
attack, even if the attack is not imminent.16  Some have referred to the permissibility of acting 
in the “last feasible window of opportunity” before the attack occurs, particularly when the 
threat is posed by cyber operations or weapons of mass destruction.17 
As a result, it is critical for a state to reasonably assess when an armed attack is 
imminent.  Machine learning may help a state assess the statistical likelihood that certain pre-
attack activities by another state will develop into an actual attack, and help a state assess the 
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gravity of a particular, looming threat that might materialize.18 Additionally, a state might use 
machine learning algorithms to assist it in performing risk calculations about the levels of 
force that might be used by it and against it. For instance, a state that fears an impending 
armed attack might seek to calculate the risk of false positives and false negatives—that is, 
how much damage it might suffer if it does not use force anticipatorily, how much damage it 
might cause if it acts in anticipatory self-defense unnecessarily, and how much damage its 
enemy likely would inflict on it if it were to act in anticipatory self-defense.19 
Risk analysis has long been recognised as a crucial tool in decision-making in other 
spheres of government, from health care provision to the criminal justice system,20 but it 
appears to be comparatively under-utilized in government decisions on the use of force. 
Notwithstanding the many academic writings that exist on risk analysis in going to war, it is 
questionable whether high-ranking political and military officials today undertake the kind of 
detailed risk reviews that happen in other fields. In health care, for example, an analysis of 
the statistical probabilities and cumulative effects of false positives and false negatives are 
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commonplace in policy-making.21 The proliferation of machine learning might prompt 
political and military officials to follow course and rely more heavily on detailed machine 
learning risk assessments when deciding whether and how to use force. 
One reason to think that states may employ machine learning this way is that states 
are already seeking to create “early warning systems,” of which pre-attack detection might be 
one type.22  As one former intelligence analyst noted, “Intelligence agencies use advanced 
algorithms to interpret the meaning of intercepted communications, identify persons of 
interest, and anticipate major events.”23  Machine learning algorithms crafted to anticipate the 
fact and location of particular threatening geopolitical developments—such as the movement 
of missile launchers or increased chatter over terrorist networks—might also share some 
commonalities with existing risk assessment algorithms that national and local governments 
use to allocate law enforcement resources toward particular locations where crime is most 
likely to occur.24 Indeed, in one recent political science study, scholars were able to use 
machine learning tools to identify changes in news coverage in authoritarian regimes in the 
lead-up to armed conflict.25  Tools like these might provide critical information to states that 
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believe that they are facing an imminent armed attack. Of course, a number of machine 
learning-based risk assessments have faced criticisms regarding the quality and reliability of 
outputs, as well as potential bias. States should address such concerns before they deploy 
these systems in a use of force context, an issue we discuss further below.26 
Whether there is sufficient (and sufficiently accurate) historical data around which 
one could build predictive algorithms today is unclear.  One significant challenge is that 
historical data is harder to locate and, because it is often not in an electronic format, harder to 
use than contemporary data.  (Unlike twenty years ago, most actors today keep electronic 
records of their activities.)  However, a U.S. Department of Defense report recently argued 
that the capability to develop early warning systems 
 
may soon be achievable.  Massive datasets are increasingly abundant and could 
contain predictive clues . . . . Recent advances in data science, ever-improving 
computational resources, and new insights into social dynamics offer the possibility 
that we could leverage these massive data sources to make actionable predictions 
about future world events.27 
 
The United Nations, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, and the U.S. Department of 
Defense are already attempting to parse public data to anticipate when and where conflict 
may arise.28  As governments continue to collect vast quantities of data on a wide variety of 
topics, it is increasingly likely that they will begin to train predictive algorithms in support of 
use of force decision-making in the near future. 
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B. Automaticity in Self-Defense 
 
The examples described in section A represent cases in which machine learning 
algorithms are used to inform a state’s response to a particular scenario.  However, 
particularly in the cyber context, states are likely to enable machine learning-driven 
algorithms to respond themselves to incoming cyber operations that take place at the speed of 
light.  That is, states may grant algorithms a direct role in decision-making. To the best of our 
knowledge, most current cyber defenses engage primarily in self-preservation against 
incoming attacks, for example by erecting firewalls and shutting themselves off from outside 
networks to prevent further damage. Notwithstanding the current reactive posture, it is 
entirely possible that in certain circumstances states could program their systems to respond 
with a form of counter-attack, a “hack-back” of sorts, to disable the systems launching the 
cyber-attack. These cyber operations implicate the use of force to the extent that the offensive 
cyber operations constitute (cyber) armed attacks and the responsive cyber operations 
represent acts of self-defense. Of course, it is important to distinguish among different types 
of responses to cyber armed attacks, and to note that not all responses will qualify as uses of 
force necessitating a self-defense-based justification.29 
This use of machine learning seems relatively near at hand, based on publicly stated 
concerns by military officials in cyber-capable states. For instance, an Obama-era senior 
acquisitions official at the U.S. Department of Defense argued that “making our robots wait 
for human permission would slow them down so much that enemy AI without such 
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constraints would beat us.”30 A Pentagon Defense Science Board study discusses “automated 
cyber responses.”31 Significantly, the U.S. Department of Defense Directive on Autonomy in 
Weapons Systems does not apply to autonomous cyberspace platforms for cyber operations, 
leaving the U.S. military less constrained in developing and employing cyber weapons that 
might act in automated self-defense.32 
Creating a lawful system of automated cyber self-defense that can respond in a timely 
manner to incoming attacks will require the algorithm’s programmers to (a) determine 
whether the incoming cyber operations amount to an armed attack, a use of force, or another 
form of unlawful intervention; (b) initiate a corresponding automated cyber response that 
qualifies as an act of self-defense or counter-measure, depending on the nature of the 
incoming operation;33 and (c) ensure that the nature of the response adheres to the applicable 
legal rules, such as necessity and proportionality for self-defense.34 Given the speed at which 
cyber operations occur, automation may be necessary: human involvement may be simply 
impossible, at least in certain respects. However, if two states both employ algorithms that act 
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in automated self-defense, they may find themselves in an armed conflict without either 
immediately knowing it. It presumably will be possible for machine learning algorithms to 
game out various responses (to and fro between the parties) and to both select the best one for 
the attacked state and to identify potential consequences (facilitating some form of early 
warning, or human-focused alert). Such systems would not be dissimilar to the algorithms 
that are performing so successfully at Go.35 It presumably also will be possible for 
programmers to establish certain limits to the algorithm’s responses, although—as discussed 
in the next part—there are situations in which algorithms act unpredictably when confronting 
other algorithms.36 Given the risk of escalation, it seems essential that safeguards be put in 
place, which may include limiting the parameters within which an algorithm can act or 
triggering an alarm when certain conditions are present. 
Although cyber operations are the most obvious situations in which states may choose 
to employ algorithms that enable automatic responses (some of which may require claiming a 
legal right to self-defense), similar issues might arise in the context of automated air defense 
systems or in confrontations between unmanned aerial or underwater vehicles. Using 
machine learning tools, states may construct these systems to allow an unmanned underwater 
vehicle, say, to identify the object it is confronting, make sense of the object’s movements, 
determine whether the object is a foreign, unmanned weapons platform, and respond almost 
instantaneously to a missile fired from that foreign platform.37 It may also be possible for 
programmers to incorporate the concept of an imminent threat, which would enter the realm 
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of automatic anticipatory self-defense, or to link up different systems, facilitating automated 
counter-offensive operations.38  Although it would be possible to keep a “human on the loop” 
in both the cyber and unmanned vehicle contexts, “the value of such algorithms resides in 
their ability to initiate immediate responses.  Once an AI system detects an imminent attack, 
its value would reside in the ability to respond before the attack could take place.”39  The 
temptation to rely on the algorithm alone to guide decision-making therefore will be 
powerful. 
 
C. Informing Necessity and Proportionality Analyses 
 
Before using force in self-defense, a state must determine that the use of force is 
necessary (that is, that no other peaceable options exist and that the force is limited to that 
which is required).40 Assuming that force is necessary, that state also must limit its response 
to that which is proportionate to defeat the attack or the threat raised thereby.41 As with 
predictions about whether and when an attack might occur, states may turn to machine 
learning to help them predict with greater certainty whether force is necessary and what 
levels of responsive force would be proportionate. 
It is precisely this ability to work through a range of different options and likely 
associated outcomes that represents a key added value of machine learning.  For instance, 
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algorithms might help a state calculate whether means other than force might be sufficient to 
address an attack, or algorithms may recommend which targets, if hit, might most effectively 
suppress the forcible conduct.  For example, the algorithm might recommend that the 
defending state target a particular command center rather than a particular missile installation 
to most effectively stop the attack. The use of machine learning in self-defense is likely to 
form part of an interconnected system: one algorithm might indicate that a forcible response 
is necessary, while a different algorithm might help the state calculate the predicted effects of 
its response, thereby facilitating the state’s compliance with the proportionality rule. 
 
D. Masking the Source of an Attack to Aid Aggression 
 
Cyber conflict presents a number of new challenges that states must address.42 One 
possibility, particularly relevant to the use of machine learning, is that an attacker may launch 
certain attacks in order to provoke a (potentially automated) self-defense response by the 
victim state.43 For instance, an attacker may conceal its own act of aggression by taking over 
systems in a third state and using these systems to launch attacks on the victim state. This is a 
relatively straightforward case of deception. However, assume an attacker knows that the 
victim state employs defensive machine learning algorithms.  The attacker may attempt to 
further manipulate the situation by not just seeking to mask its own use of force, but by 
attempting to trigger an act of self-defense by the victim state against the third state that will 
necessitate a response by the third state, resulting in an armed conflict between the victim and 
third states. This strategy may attempt to manipulate (or “game”) the victim’s machine 
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learning algorithm, to increase the likelihood of the desired response. For instance, the 
attacker could utilise critical infrastructure in the third state to launch its attack, so that the 
response by the victim state would cause harm to the third state’s critical infrastructure. This, 
in turn, increases the likelihood that the third state will be pushed into responding to any use 
of force by the victim state. 
The attacker may seek to further increase the likelihood of this outcome by 
incorporating a combination of other means, such as fake communications chatter in the 
victim and third states (indicating increased planning activity, etc.), the use of video and 
audio forgeries, and the large-scale deployment of bots to contribute to increased public 
discourse.44 As all of these sources are likely to provide input data for a self-defense 
algorithm, they may contribute to the manipulation of any resultant risk scores. False-flag 
deception by militaries has long existed,45 but the use of machine learning makes such tactics 
both more likely and more likely to be effective, while raising concerns regarding the 
potential for “gaming” automated response systems. 
 
III. CHALLENGES SURROUNDING MACHINE LEARNING AND THE LAW ON THE RESORT TO 
FORCE 
 
The previous part discussed various scenarios in which states may seek to incorporate 
machine learning into their use of force decisions. While it is likely that states will 
                                               
44
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increasingly deploy machine learning technologies in this context, their use poses 
technological, legal, and ethical challenges.  In light of the types of machine learning that 
states might employ to guide their use of force decision-making, this Part identifies the most 
salient challenges states will confront and offers suggestions for how states might address 
these concerns. 
A. Algorithmic Quality and Reliability 
 
A number of factors are relevant to the quality and reliability of an algorithmic 
process, including: whether it is actually possible for an algorithm to perform the desired 
task, whether there is sufficient quality data to allow the algorithm to perform its task, and the 
extent to which programmers can reproduce legal rules and judgment in code. These factors 
should in turn influence both a state’s decision to deploy an algorithm and the manner in 
which the state deploys it. 
1. Is it possible for an algorithm to perform the desired task? 
 
Before developing or deploying an algorithm in a use of force context, the first 
question to ask is whether it is actually possible, in principle, for an algorithm to perform the 
required task.  The answer depends upon both the nature of machine learning and the nature 
of the situation to which machine learning is applied. 
Machine learning operates on the basis of correlation, not causation.46 As such, the 
algorithms analyse input data points against a specified output to identify patterns of 
correlation. Put simply, this enables the algorithm to establish that, if certain input factors are 
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present, then it is likely—to a certain degree of accuracy—that a particular output or 
consequence will follow. The accuracy of the output is affected by both the quality and 
quantity of the input data.47 Certain problems are more amenable to this type of reasoning 
than others. A (simplified) distinction may be made between problems that involve logical 
patterns, or some form of cause and effect, and those that involve inherent uncertainty or 
randomness.48 
Applied to the use of force, it is easy to see that machine learning algorithms can be 
deployed straightforwardly to detect live cyber-attacks, as these would be relatively 
measurable and more obviously likely to cause harm. Such attacks involve communications 
that flow across the architecture of the Internet, and that may be detected by identifying a 
particular pattern or profile associated with a specific attack, or by noting unusual 
communications patterns.49  Out of the ordinary activity may indicate that an attack is either 
in preparation or actually occurring. Conversely, algorithms such as those that make 
recommendations regarding whether a use of force is proportionate may face greater 
challenges. These predictions appear closer to the kinds of modelling that militaries currently 
conduct when estimating collateral damage. However, proportionality in the use of force 
context entails more than just a calculation of anticipated harm from specific military 
operations, and must include wider assessment of overall harm to the affected state relative to 
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aims of the defensive response.50 An algorithm would therefore need to be far more 
sophisticated than current military models. That said, although the problem is more complex 
than making collateral damage estimates, it is of a similar nature, and an effective solution 
may only be a matter of time. 
The use of machine learning to predict whether a state is likely to launch a traditional 
kinetic attack is equally problematic. The circumstances in which states use force are so 
vastly diverse that comparisons across examples may be irrelevant. Equally, a significant 
element of uncertainty and unpredictability often surrounds the decision to use force. For 
instance, one state may undertake aggressive posturing or brinksmanship to indicate that it is 
prepared to use force or to prompt a particular reaction in a rival state, even though it is not 
actually planning to undertake forcible acts.51  Internal or international political dynamics—
and even inherent human unpredictability—may also affect any decision to use or threaten 
force. As such, any algorithm analysing this situation must not only take into account obvious 
matters such as troop movements or weapons stockpiling, but also factors such as political 
dynamics between and within states, economic interests, and human psychology. The use of 
an algorithm to predict the likelihood that a state will use force is therefore far from 
straightforward. 
2. Is there sufficient high-quality data for the algorithm to perform its task? 
 
The next question is whether there is data of sufficient quality to allow the algorithm 
to perform its task to the required degree of accuracy and reliability. One key issue is the 
availability of training data. As noted, machine learning algorithms work on the basis of 
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correlation and so sufficient training data (that is, input data linked to associated outcomes) is 
required in order to train the model so that it can be applied to new situations.52 Again, while 
this may not be a problem in the context of cyber operations, it is likely to be a significant 
factor with respect to the decision to launch an armed attack. Although there have been far 
too many casualties of war in recent decades, the number of incidents internationally 
recognized as qualifying as armed attacks since the UN Charter came into force is relatively 
small.53 This will affect the accuracy of any algorithmic decision, and may indicate that states 
should postpone creation and deployment of this type of algorithm until sufficient data is 
available. 
Embedded in the question of reliability is the challenge of determining precisely how 
accurate algorithms should be before states feel comfortable using them.  This question has 
arisen in the autonomous weapons context as well.54  Must the algorithm produce results that 
are as good as those humans produce before a state uses it?  Should a state only employ 
algorithms that make more accurate predictions than humans make?  States will need to 
answer these questions at the same time that they assess the quality and quantity of data 
needed to produce useable algorithms, and the degree of explainability required; that is, they 
need to define what a “useable” algorithm is. 
An added complexity with respect to algorithmic quality is the issue of bias.55 This 
relates to both input data and the operation of the algorithm itself. For instance, the state (and 
indeed the programmer herself) will inevitably incorporate institutional values and 
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preferences into code. A self-defense algorithm of a state that is deeply hesitant to use force, 
or that analyzes situations through a particular world view, will operate differently than an 
algorithm of a state that is more willing to employ force (and interprets the Charter and 
customary law as more permissive), or that analyses situations through a different political 
lens.  These two states would need (and elect) to train their algorithms on different kinds of 
historical examples that reflect their own preferred approaches to self-defense. In addition, 
threat assessments will, as stated in the previous section, require an analysis of the political 
discourse and cultural, social, and psychological profiling of decision-making dynamics in 
other states. This creates an additional risk of programming bias in relation to the way 
algorithms are designed to interpret actions of specific states, because states may incorporate 
(possibly faulty) preconceptions about other states into the machine learning process.   
3. The difficulty of encoding legal rules 
 
Another significant challenge—one faced by anyone creating an algorithm that makes 
recommendations driven by underlying bodies of law—is the difficulty of translating broad 
legal rules into very precise code.56  In the use of force context, an algorithm created to help a 
state respond in self-defense would need to reflect the appropriate international law triggers: 
a determination that an armed attack has occurred or is imminent.57  A programmer crafting 
an algorithm that a state might use to help it gauge the lawful scope of a forcible defensive 
response would need to convert contested and malleable concepts such as necessity and 
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proportionality into discrete, binary decision trees.  This already has proven a challenge in 
domestic legal systems that employ algorithms to make decisions about how to allocate 
welfare benefits and who to exclude from air travel, for instance.58  It is likely to prove an 
even harder problem in international law, because concepts often exist at a higher level of 
generality and because there may be less consensus among stakeholders about how to 
interpret these concepts. The approach that a state takes to international law, including in the 
realm of use of force, rarely takes the form of a rigid set of rules, is usually context 
dependent, and often is subject to a range of views and changing administrations. Efforts to 
transform this into code would therefore require constant debate and the ability to 
continuously edit and change fundamental sections of the algorithm.  Further, coders are 
unlikely to have experience with or training in law, making the translation exercise fraught. 
 
4. What does this mean for the use of algorithms? 
 
The above discussion indicates that states should take a number of factors into 
account when considering the use of machine learning algorithms in a use of force context. 
An initial question is whether the algorithm can actually perform the desired task.  There is a 
distinction between the use of algorithms to make a decision and the use of algorithms to 
inform a decision.  The latter is far less radical than the former.  A follow-on step is then to 
ensure that the algorithm has sufficient quality of data, including training data, and is coded 
appropriately, so that the state can ensure its quality and reliability, or at least quantify those 
characteristics.  The state additionally must ensure that the algorithm’s users know the 
circumstances in which the algorithm can work, its level of accuracy, and what it can or 
cannot do. This will help to ensure that those deploying algorithms, or making decisions 
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informed by algorithms, are aware of the algorithms’ limitations and can effectively evaluate 
outputs.59 
States might take a number of other measures to enhance quality and reliability. For 
instance, states might hard-code the prioritisation of particular (reliable) intelligence sources 
into the design; might identify acceptable levels of accuracy, and therefore of false positives 
and false negatives; and might facilitate close interaction between developers and 
international lawyers during the design process. 
 
B. Level of Human Involvement 
 
Whenever government officials deploy algorithms to guide their decision-making, 
they must determine how heavily to rely on those algorithms in weighing courses of action. 
For several of the use of force scenarios described in Part II, machine learning tools seem 
likely to provide valuable guidance, but are unlikely to receive absolute deference from 
states’ leadership and their militaries.  That is, states may use algorithms to inform and 
supplement human decision-making, but generally are unlikely to grant those algorithms 
decision-making authority. The “automatic self-defense” cyber scenarios discussed above, 
however, pose a deeper challenge, one that potentially pits practicality against ethics: Should 
war-and-peace decisions necessarily be made by humans? 
 
1. The concept of “meaningful human control” 
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States, scholars, and ethicists have begun to consider these questions in the heated 
debate about lethal autonomous weapons systems, sometimes referred to pejoratively as 
“killer robots.”  As some anticipate a future in which states will deploy fully autonomous 
robots to identify and kill combatants, various actors have argued that it is imperative for a 
human to maintain “meaningful human control” over decisions to employ force during armed 
conflict.60  The use of algorithms in relation to the initial decisions on resort to force raise 
similar questions, perhaps even with added urgency. If the possibility that a machine might be 
given the power to “decide” to kill a single enemy soldier is fraught with ethical and legal 
debates, what are we to make of the possibility that a machine could ultimately determine 
whether a nation goes to war, and thus impact thousands or millions of lives? 
Disappointingly, a closer look at “meaningful human control” in the autonomous 
weapons discourse reveals it to be deceptively alluring but substantively vague and unhelpful. 
A number of actors and scholars have attempted to define the concept, focusing upon 
elements such as the nature of the role the human plays in the use of such weapons; the 
availability of appropriate information for the human operator; and the effective control the 
human has over the system.61 All these elements are, however, subject to differing 
interpretations that become even more apparent when one moves from the debate over 
autonomous weapon systems into the use of algorithms in the jus ad bellum.     
In the autonomous weapons sphere, one issue at stake is whether a machine should be 
allowed to have the final “say” in whether to pull the trigger and kill an individual. 
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Reasonable arguments have been made pointing out advantages and disadvantages to the 
various approaches,62 but ultimately this appears to be a question of policy and ethics rather 
than law. While it remains an open ethical question in the autonomous weapons sphere, the 
corresponding issue is less likely to be a debate for the jus ad bellum. It may be theoretically 
correct that in certain circumstances we would be safer by placing our trust in a well-
designed algorithm than in allowing irrational and unpredictable leaders to control nuclear 
red buttons. Nonetheless, a world in which the final decision on taking the nation to war is 
delegated to a computer is hard to imagine, and while the future may hold surprises, for the 
time being such scenarios can be filed under the fictional part of science fiction. At least two 
situations do emerge, however, that pose challenges vis-à-vis human involvement. The first is 
the use of algorithms to inform the decision-making process. The second is the potential need 
to allow algorithms to make decisions (that may rise to the level of the use of force) in 
particular contexts, notably cyber.63  
 
2. Algorithms that inform 
 
Algorithms could—and arguably are likely to—play a crucial role in almost every 
part of the decision-making process leading up to the point when a state initiates force. Their 
use is likely to grow in particular in the area of threat assessment, thereby providing the 
foundations upon which humans make the decision to go war. Machine calculations could 
consequently play a critical role in life and death decisions for whole countries, impacting far 
more lives than the autonomous weapons currently being so vigorously debated. This is 
perhaps a natural result of the tendency to pay more attention to individualised contexts than 
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to abstract policy. For example, introducing algorithms that calculate survival chances and 
cost-effectiveness to determine whether to pull the plug on a single terminally ill individual 
would probably horrify many, even though we might accept using algorithms for cost-
effectiveness calculations that affect the provision of healthcare and medicines to millions.  
In the context of resort to force, the role of algorithms in the underlying calculations 
could lead states to unwittingly make war-related decisions almost entirely based on machine 
calculations and recommendations.64 A key concern is that, even if the final war-making 
decision rests with humans (in this case, a state’s executive branch), the degree to which that 
human involvement is considered “meaningful” may be questioned. Two relevant factors are 
(a) the centrality of algorithms to the decision-making process, and (b) the deference given to 
algorithmically-produced decisions. 
First, as algorithms become increasingly central to state decision-making processes, 
the number of algorithmic recommendations that inform—and therefore influence—a final 
decision is likely to increase. This means that the impact of any inadequacy within the 
underlying algorithm65 may be magnified. The potential exists for a cascade effect, whereby a 
small bias in the first algorithmic recommendation is fed into a second algorithmic 
recommendation, which in turn skews the input for a third recommendation, and so on. 
Within any inter-connected and inter-dependent process, the impact of even a small error may 
be extensive.66 This means that although a human may make the final decision, the basis on 
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which that decision is made, and the range of available options, may have been heavily 
influenced by the underlying algorithm(s).  
The other factor is the deference granted to algorithmically-produced decisions, a 
phenomenon often referred to as “automation bias.” Some studies have found that operators 
of automated systems tend to trust those systems’ answers,67 including in circumstances in 
which their own judgment or experience would have led to a different conclusion.68 One 
reason for this may be that people presume that algorithmic decisions are made on the basis 
of indisputable hard science, or operate at a level beyond human capacity, or because people 
fear overruling the computer and “getting it wrong.” This phenomenon is likely to be 
exacerbated in the context of use of force decisions. It is in the very nature of algorithmic 
systems to engage in complex and potentially undecipherable calculations, and to compute 
across a scale of factors and at a speed that humans cannot replicate.69 Even if one takes the 
position that the decision to use force at the state level must not be delegated to machines, it 
is hard to escape the fact that algorithms are likely to play a growing role in all of the 
underlying calculations.  The more advanced algorithms become, the less meaningful human 
decisions become. Ensuring the algorithms’ quality and reliability, as well as transparency 
and explainability, will therefore be of utmost importance.70 States must also take the human 
factor into consideration. The likelihood that a human operator will defer to an algorithmic 
decision may only increase in the resort to force context, as the potential consequences 
associated with overruling an algorithmic recommendation and deciding not to use force are 
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significant, to say the least.  As a result, individuals should be trained to resist unwarranted 
automation bias. 
 
3. Algorithms that make direct decisions 
 
In certain contexts, transferring decision-making to an algorithm may be necessary. 
This is most obviously the case in the cyber sphere, though it is possible that the need may 
arise in other cases as well, such as in situations of leadership decapitation. When computer 
systems come under a cyber-attack, the most efficient response will often be an immediate 
one generated by the machine itself. Indeed, operations may occur at such speed that human 
decision-making is rendered inadequate. In most cases this will involve a system undertaking 
purely defensive measures to prevent further intrusion and damage, such as closing itself off 
from the network.71 However, it is also possible that a state could craft an automated cyber 
counter-attack to halt an ongoing attack, or to harm the source from which the initial attack 
originated. There is growing awareness of the possibility that cyber operations could lead to 
actual harm in the physical domain,72 which would be equally true of cyber counter-attacks in 
self-defense.  
Moreover, even if it is less likely, at least in the near term, that the use of autonomous 
cyber defenses will lead to human death, it is quite possible that a state’s cyber defenses, 
pitted against another state’s cyber algorithms, might ultimately place those two states in a 
situation of armed conflict. Given the potential that such a scenario could unfold as a result of 
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direct interaction between computer systems without an affirmative human decision, it may 
be wise to limit the capabilities of these systems. We recognise that a state’s right of self-
defense is applicable in the cyber sphere, and that in some circumstances this may necessitate 
the use of cyber counter-operations that respond faster than humans and with an ability to 
cause counter-damage. However, we suggest that any such operations be calibrated to have 
the lowest possible effect necessary in order to halt the attack against the system until a 
human can evaluate the situation, and that an alert system be put in place.73 While self-
defense may allow for operations that go beyond purely repelling the attack of the moment,74 
further counter-offensive operations in line with a wider understanding of the legal aims and 
limits of self-defense should only take place after consideration by the appropriate political 
and military leadership.     
 
C. Transparency and Explainability 
 
States generally are reluctant to disclose how they make decisions about resorting to 
force, and what information they have taken into account in making particular force-related 
decisions.  One reason for this is that they wish to conceal their sources of information and 
the intelligence methods they employed to obtain that information.  This lack of transparency 
may be amplified in contexts in which a state employs machine learning to assist it in making 
use of force decisions. For instance, the state may not be able to fully explain how or why the 
algorithm reached a particular conclusion, it may be loath to reveal the contents of the 
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algorithm, or it may even be reluctant to indicate that it deploys algorithms at all in the use of 
force context. 
A significant challenge posed by the use of algorithms generally, and by machine 
learning in particular, is that individuals receiving the computer program’s recommendations 
often will not know precisely how the program arrived at its conclusion.  A common form of 
machine learning uses “neural nets,” algorithms that recognize patterns by teaching 
themselves how to weight different components of the input data.75 This weighting is often 
invisible. Thus, although the algorithm’s creators will know the nature of the input data in 
general terms, they may not know the weight the algorithm gave to particular input points.76  
For instance, it may not be possible to determine the weight that an algorithm gave to troop 
movements, human intelligence, social media chatter, or indeed a previously unanticipated 
set of factors that the algorithm identified. Critics worry about reliance on algorithms that 
cannot explain to their users how they reached a particular outcome or recommendation;77 
these concerns may be compounded if states do not adequately address issues relating to 
algorithmic quality and reliability. A solution may take the form of “explainable algorithms,” 
which are algorithms that can, to a greater or lesser extent, list the factors taken into account 
and explicate the weighting given to each factor.78 Of course, even this task is not 
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straightforward. The vast quantity of input data, and the complexity of the weighting and the 
relationships between data points, may pose challenges for human comprehension.79 
Transparency and explainability are particularly important in a legal context, and 
various audiences often seek or demand greater transparency about state decision-making in 
the use of force context.  A state may be pressed by the UN Security Council, its allies, other 
states, and its domestic and foreign publics to explain why it undertook a particular use of 
force.  In limited cases, another state might even be able to pursue a case against it in the 
International Court of Justice, where it would have to account more clearly for its decision-
making.80 Further, being transparent about what information guided a decision to use force 
can help a state persuade other states that its force was legitimate (as happened with Israel’s 
strike on the al Kibar facility in Syria).  States therefore must be prepared to address 
questions about the use of algorithms in the jus ad bellum context, where other states and the 
public generally will be unsatisfied with a government explanation that asserts, “We went to 
war because the computer told us to.” 
In the area of threat assessments, in which states are more likely to use algorithms 
extensively, a greater form of transparency should, in principle, be achievable. A machine 
that simply provides a final conclusion that “an anticipated attack is estimated at 90%” is not 
transparent, and could lead to a high risk of automation bias in which the humans decide to 
act on the basis of percentages without understanding their origin. However, it should in 
theory be possible for the machine to reveal the information on which its estimation is 
based.81 For example, it could note that its calculations are based on satellite imagery of troop 
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movements and the stock-piling of weapons by another state, combined with analysis of that 
state’s past behaviour in similar circumstances. This would allow the executive and military 
leadership to make informed decisions, incorporate any additional contextual information of 
which they are aware, and identify what information might be missing from the machine’s 
analysis. 
Concerns over explainability and transparency are heightened in circumstances in 
which machines are designed to initiate action without human involvement (such as 
automated responses to cyber threats). If the deep learning process prevents the state from 
understanding how the machine’s neural networks reach a conclusion, then in effect it 
becomes difficult—and perhaps impossible—to predict the actions a defensive system might 
take in response to an attack. Would it be lawful to deploy a system whose actions we cannot 
predict, and moreover to do so in the context of use of force?  The answer may depend on 
how we define predictability and what it is that we need to predict. On the one hand, it might 
imply being able to predict each and every step the machine would take in any given context. 
This would allow for greater transparency and explainability, but would probably only be 
possible with systems that operate on the basis of pre-programmed rules of logic.  On the 
other hand, if a state unleashed the full power of machine learning based on deep neural 
networks, it would likely mean that the state would be unable to predict each and every step 
the algorithm takes, because the algorithm would be able to adapt and develop new solutions 
to emerging and dynamic situations. 
A different approach to predictability might be to accept the impossibility of knowing 
in advance the precise details of each step the machine might take, but require confidence that 
whatever actions it does initiate, the parameters of its programming ensure that these actions 
will always be within the limits of the applicable legal framework. In other words, the focus 
would be on reliability rather than predictability. This approach might be acceptable insofar 
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as it does not allow for violations of the law on the resort to force, but it does create a serious 
challenge to the above-noted desire for transparency and explainability. If states choose to 
require the latter, it may prove impossible for now to use machine learning systems whose 
black box of reasoning we cannot crack. This concern is one more reason that, in the limited 
circumstances in which machines can initiate responses, they should be programmed to focus 
on the (more predictable) minimal defensive actions necessary, rather than allowing for 
counter-offensives.82 
 
D. Attribution 
 
It sometimes can be difficult for a victim state to correctly attribute the source of an 
armed attack. South Korea, for instance, took several weeks to attribute the sinking of one of 
its warships to North Korea.83  Other examples include proxy wars during the Cold War era, 
where both the United States and the U.S.S.R. sought to conceal their participation in 
unconventional conflicts.84  Nevertheless, it is imperative for a state to be able to make such 
an attribution to be able to know where, how, and against which actors to respond. 
The process of attributing responsibility for a use of force to a specific state or entity 
is particularly difficult in a cyber context. This is due to both the nature of cyber operations 
and the architecture of the Internet. For example, cyber operations such as the Stuxnet worm 
may utilise malicious software, and it may be possible to identify that an attack is occurring, 
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and even that the attack is the result of particular software. Moving beyond this to attribute 
responsibility, however, gives rise to a number of complexities. For instance, determining the 
developer (or deployer) of malicious software is difficult. It may be possible to reverse 
engineer the software in order to extract the original source code, which can offer certain 
clues as to the author; it may be the case that the language used, or the repetition of 
previously identified code, provide concrete hints. It is equally possible, however, that the 
code’s creators planted ostensible clues in the source code with the intent to mislead.  
Moving beyond the strict confines of cyber, if an aggressor deploys a machine 
learning algorithm in the use of force context and the victim state is able to access that 
algorithm, the opacity inherent in the use of such algorithm may hinder a victim state’s 
analysis of whether the attack was intentional or accidental. For instance, it may be difficult 
to understand the reasoning underpinning a machine learning recommendation or decision, 
and in any event, it may be straightforward for the aggressor to bury or disguise intent within 
the code. Of course, the “aggressor” state may still claim it was an accident, and the victim 
state may claim the right to respond regardless of intent,85 but the use of machine learning 
presents increased opportunities for obfuscation. 
Factors such as those described above render attribution difficult, and may limit the 
extent to which a victim state may exercise its right to self-defense.  In particular, it may be 
the case that a victim state can take self-defense measures to halt an attack, but cannot take 
further, otherwise proportionate, measures because of its inability to directly attribute the 
attack. The complexity inherent in these issues may be illustrated by an example.  Assume 
that a state suffers an armed attack that it tracks back to an algorithmic source but cannot 
attribute that algorithm to a recognized actor. Is it possible to speak of self-defense measures 
absent attribution of the armed attack? In past years there has been much discourse 
                                               
85
 On the role of intent in the jus ad bellum see ILA Report, supra note 40. 
 35 
 
surrounding self-defense against armed groups.86 The United States, United Kingdom, and 
other states have argued that states may engage in self-defense against armed groups 
operating from the territory of other states but without attribution to the other state.  That is, 
the right to self-defense is not predicated on the identity of the attacker but on the need of the 
victim state to use force to defend itself. However, in these scenarios, states and scholars have 
at least recognized the need to identify the entity behind the armed attack, even if it is an 
armed group and not a state, before considering a forcible response. 
Taking the analogy from the realm of nonstate actors one step further, imagine that 
the source code appears to show that machines in State A have, through computer networks, 
caused significant material harm in State B, such as explosions in power stations and military 
installations that caused loss of life. State A denies responsibility and claims that it did not 
design or control the algorithm. State B has no evidence to disprove this claim, and it may 
well be that the algorithm is the work of a third state or a nonstate actor located in a third 
state. There is no love lost between States A and B, and despite the fact that this algorithm is 
operating from servers in the former, State A refuses to shut it down. If it cannot contain the 
damage through other means, State B might claim the right to defend itself by firing a missile 
at the server farm in the territory of State A, even without evidence of who is behind the 
attack. Essentially, the question raised by the potential use of untraceable armed attacks is 
whether the victim state that suffers an attack initiated by an algorithm outside its borders has 
a right to respond even if it cannot identify the entity—state or armed group—responsible for 
the algorithm. If so, states must consider whether additional limitations should regulate such 
a response in light of these special circumstances. 
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E. Accountability for a Wrongful Use of Force 
 
It is possible that the opacity associated with machine learning algorithms may 
frustrate accountability efforts. If a state makes a decision on the basis of machine learning, 
the state may not be able to identify or explain the reasoning underpinning that decision. As a 
result, that state may attempt to deflect scrutiny by pointing to the nature of algorithmic 
decision-making. A state in this position would effectively be arguing that, if it cannot 
foresee what an algorithm will do, it cannot be held responsible.  
These suggestions fail to take into account existing obligations under international 
law. States deploy algorithms to perform particular tasks. As such, the state will be held 
responsible for the acts of the algorithm, in the same manner as it is held responsible for the 
acts of (human) state agents.87 Responsibility cannot be negated simply by the decision to 
deploy an algorithm: this would undermine the entire framework of international law. Of 
course, states’ continued responsibility poses particular challenges in the context of machine 
learning, but these are far from insurmountable, and a number of possibilities exist. States’ 
due diligence obligations are particularly relevant. These require that states undertake a 
number of measures before deploying use of force algorithms, such as testing and impact 
assessments, and exercise continued oversight during their use. These measures would ensure 
that, although a state may not know the specific decision that an algorithm will reach in a 
particular situation, it must, at a minimum, assure itself as to the parameters within which the 
algorithm operates, the accuracy of the algorithmic model, its limitations, and whether it can 
make or simply inform a decision. While it is unreasonable to expect an error-free process, 
just as in any area of decision-making, it seems reasonable to demand a level of due 
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diligence, according to which a state should be able to explain the algorithmic decision-
making process and why it took a particular course of action.88  
These requirements further indicate that the use of machine learning may actually 
facilitate transparency and accountability. Satisfying the above-mentioned international legal 
obligations before they deploy algorithms will force states to ensure that they have an 
appropriately structured decision-making process. This process, and (for instance) its 
emphasis on the need to understand how an algorithm weighted particular input factors, may 
enable a state to give an explanation of the reasoning underpinning a decision that is more 
accessible than human reasoning, and would be preferable to an explanation that simply 
invoked the official’s “experience” or “intuition.” 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
  
The goal of this essay was to identify different decision-making points that arise in the 
context of states’ use of force, to anticipate ways in which states may resort to machine 
learning algorithms to inform or make those decisions, and to highlight potential legal, 
policy, and ethical challenges that will arise as they do so.  In general, we suggest that there 
may be situations in which the use of machine learning algorithms could actually improve the 
accuracy of states’ use of force decision-making, but there are also situations in which states 
should be exceedingly cautious in resorting to machine learning tools.  
There are some potentially broader implications for the use of force as machine 
learning tools proliferate, which we flag here for future consideration.  One overarching 
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question is whether the gradual adoption of machine learning and, in the cyber context, the 
eventual automation of cyber responses will increase or decrease the likelihood that states 
will resort to force, offensively or defensively.  Will machine learning tools further empower 
states that already have technologically sophisticated militaries and reduce certain existing 
barriers to resorting to force?  Will these tools instead create a modest deterrent effect, at 
least as between state militaries that have each publicly deployed machine learning tools?  Or 
will the ease of obscuring attribution using machine learning tools undermine the deterrent 
effect that Article 51 currently provides because victim states will be unable to assess where 
to direct their acts of self-defense? 
There are other implications on the domestic plane, if we believe that an increasing 
use of algorithmic tools will widen the democracy deficit in national choices about resort to 
force (especially in the automatic cyber-defense context). Machine learning algorithms might 
disempower parliaments that have a constitutional role to play in decisions to go to war, and 
might, in view of their opacity, disempower interested publics who might oppose a given 
conflict. Now is the time, however, for these publics to make their views on machine learning 
known to the governments that will surely develop these tools. 
 
